Metamorphic Malware Detection Based on Support Vector Machine Classification of Malware Sub-Signatures by Khammas, Ban Mohammed et al.
TELKOMNIKA, Vol. 14, No. 3, September 2016, pp. 1157 ∼ 1165
ISSN: 1693-6930, accredited A by DIKTI, Decree No: 58/DIKTI/Kep/2013
DOI: 10.12928/telkomnika.v14.i3.3850  1157
Metamorphic Malware Detection Based on Support
Vector Machine Classification of Malware
Sub-Signatures
Ban Mohammed Khammas , Alireza Monemi , Ismahani Ismail , Sulaiman Mohd Nor , and
M.N. Marsono*
Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, 81310, Johor Bahru, Johor Malaysia
*Corresponding author, e-mail: mnadzir@utm.my
Abstract
Achieving accurate and efficient metamorphic malware detection remains a challenge. Metamorphic mal-
ware is able to mutate and alter its code structure in each infection that can circumvent signature matching
detection. However, some vital functionalities and code segments remain unchanged between mutations.
We exploit these unchanged features by the mean of classification using Support Vector Machine (SVM).
N-gram features are extracted directly from malware binaries to avoid disassembly, which these features
are then masked with the extracted known malware signature n-grams. These masked features reduce the
number of selected n-gram features considerably. Our method is capable to accurately detect metamorphic
malware with ~99% accuracy and low false positive rate. The proposed method is also superior to commer-
cially available anti-viruses for detecting metamorphic malware.
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1. Introduction
Malware is one of security attacks to Internet users as it breaches computer security and
data confidentiality, which are categorized into general (non-mutable) and mutable types. Anti-
virus softwares rely on signature-based detection as the primary detection mechanism. Mutatable
malware such as packing, polymorphic, and metamorphic make the detection based on signature
matching difficult. Metamorphic malwares mutate and change their codes structure and signa-
tures in each infection that is difficult to detect [1]. Lately, several host-based dynamical analysis
techniques were proposed for metamorphic malware detection [2]. However, these techniques
require separate environment to analyze malware in order to be able to be detected. At the same
time, the requirement of binary code disassembly in opcode-based methods [3–5] is not suitable
for timely metamorphic detection on host-level intrusion detection systems.
We propose metamorphic malware detection based on static analysis of metamorphic
malware binaries without disassembly. Features are extracted from binary, which can be in the
form of packets payload in network detection system or files in host based detection system
using n-gram feature extraction and machine learning SVM classification. Besides, extracted n-
gram features are masked with known malware signature n-grams to represent only informative
malware features. This technique can reduce the n-gram search space.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a critical review on relevant lit-
eratures. The methodology for metamorphic malware detection in network and host-based IDS
are described in Section 3. Section 4 highlights the experimental setup, datasets, and evaluation
criteria. The data analysis and comparison with commercial anti-virus software are presented in
Section 5. Section 6 concludes the research findings, and contributions of the paper.
2. Related Work
Host-based anti-viruses (AV) and NIDS such as Snort [6] and Bro [7] primarily rely on
signature matching as one of the detection techniques. These tools search for specific signatures
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in the file or packet payload to detect malware and other types of attacks [6]. However, the inability
to detect metamorphic malware or previously unseen malware without known signatures is the
main limitation of signature-matching methods [5,8]. Metamorphic malware is a type of advanced
mutating malwares that change their structure in each mutation. These changes may contain
small number of instructions for specific functionality or enclose multiple instructions to perform
similar functionality. In each mutation, these instructions are expanded or minimized according
to obfuscation techniques used. The taxonomy of the morphing techniques that are used in
metamorphic malware include insertion of redundant code, dead instructions, NOP instructions,
unreachable code, reordering of instructions, register swapping, and substituting instructions with
equivalent instructions. The detection of mutating malware is non-trivial [3,5,9].
Several researches proposed the use of machine learning (ML) to detect malware [10,
11]. Schultz et al. [12] in their pioneering study used ML technique to detect malware, where
different feature extraction methods such as string features, program header, and byte sequence
features were investigated. Kolter and Maloof [11] used n-gram features extraction method and
improved the detection accuracy by combining n-gram technique with ML to classify malware
executable files (worm, virus, and trojan). The n-grams features are extracted and selected from
malware byte code using the Information Gain (IG) method. Furthermore, the effects of several
ML classifiers (naive Bayes, instance based learning, SVM, decision tree, and boosted classifier)
as well as the size of n-grams on the classification accuracy were analyzed. The 4-gram was
reported to offer the best accuracy.
Shabtai et al. [13] used n-gram features that extracted from opcode instead of byte code.
They examined the influence of different n-gram sizes (1 to 5) with assorted feature selection and
classifiers. The effect of term frequency inverse document frequency (TFIDF) and normalized TF
were compared. It is reported that TFIDF and TF produced almost identical results. Santos et
al. [10] proposed the use of opcode-sequence frequency to represent features based on sampled
malwares and normal files, where top 1000 features are selected using IG. Several ML classifiers
such as decision trees, SVM, k-nearest neighbours, and Bayesian were used to analyze the data
set.
Generally, static metamorphic malware detection uses opcodes or opcode n-grams as
extracted features for different detection techniques such as ML and statistical analysis [3–5,14].
Lately, control flow based method such as by Alam et al. [1] statistically analyzed the performance
of host-based metamorphic malware detection. In their method, the dataset is translated into an
intermediate language called MAIL after disassembling the program binary. The detection ac-
curacy for the dataset containing 1020 metamorphic files and 2330 normal files was reported to
be 94.69% with false positive ratio (FPR) of 10.59. Runwal et al. [15] proposed opcode graphs
technique to find the similarity of executable file for detecting metamorphic malware. Opcode se-
quences are extracted and weights are measured based on the frequency of opcode occurrences.
Most existing literatures used opcode-based features to detect metamorphic malware
despite their computational cost. For instance, opcode-based methods require disassembly of
binary code to obtain the opcode features, which are not suitable for timely metamorphic detec-
tion, especially when targeting for network-level detection. To circumvent this shortcoming, we
propose the use of ML and n-gram term frequency [10, 13] by modifying the feature extraction
and selection processes. The n-gram search space is further minimized via a two-stage feature
selection scheme. First, features that match the sub-signature features are selected. Second, the
most effective features are chosen using IG before being classified using SVM classifier.
3. Proposed Method for Metamorphic Malware Detection
Earlier studies on metamorphic detection [3–5, 14] mostly employed opcode-based fea-
ture extraction, which is applicable only in host-based detection because of the disassembly re-
quirement. The proposed method overcomes it by extracting the features directly from binaries.
Those features are masked with sub-signature n-grams for classification. Similar to previous
methods [10, 13], the term frequency of features are computed and the ML classifier is used to
classify unknown files based on the term frequency of these features.
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Figure 1 displays a screen-shot of one original metamorphic and its mutated version. The
left pane shows all similar and dissimilar metamorphic codes of these two files. Some instructions
remain unaltered during the metamorphic malware mutation when generating new metamorphic
file.
Figure 1. Comparison of two NGVCK viruses.
It is important to note that the mutation process generates metamorphic malware with in-
herited code segments from their ancestor. Some features in old metamorphic malware are kept
unchanged in the mutated malware, as malware writers reuse old code segments [1]. Complete
mutation of a metamorphic malware is deemed impossible due to the need to keep the same func-
tionality [14]. Most versions of the same malware share a combination of several unchanged code
segments [16]. Based on this hypothesis, an n-gram analysis for metamorphic malware detection
can be made by mining these inherited code segments. Figure 2 shows different processing steps
of the proposed method. n-gram sub-signatures are augmented with sub-signature obtain from
existing metamorphic file.
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Figure 2. Various stages of metamorphic malware detection via the proposed method.
1. References [17, 18] used the method of splitting the signature to equal pieces. Present
study uses overlapping 4-gram feature extraction together from Snort signature for malware
detection. These signatures are used as a case study although Bro [7] rules can also
be used. Snort signatures are split into overlapping 4-grams sub-signature. Then, term
frequency (TF) of each unique n-gram in every file is counted and normalized, as term or
byte frequency analysis is effective in files classification [19].
2. In order to minimize the large search space of n-gram, feature selection method is used. To
select the most informative sub-signature n-gram features that appear in a file, the informa-
tion gain (IG) feature selection method is employed [11].
IG(j) =
∑ ∑
vj{0.1}Ci
P (vj , Ci)log
P (vj , Ci)
P (vj)P (Ci)
(1)
where vj is the value of the j-th attribute, Ci is the i-th class, P (Ci) is the probability that
the training data is in class Ci, P (vj) is the probability that the j-th n-gram have vj value
in the training dataset, and P (vj , Ci) is the probability that in class Ci, the j-th attribute has
the value vj .
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3. Classification process requires generation of classifier model from the training dataset. The
learning algorithm trains the SVM classifier to predict if a new file is malware or non-malware.
Moreover, the SVM kernal methods can map the features into higher dimensional space by
converting nonlinear features into linear ones [14]. Compared to other ML techniques, SVM
has been reported to provide the highest malware attack detection accuracy [20]. The suc-
cess of SVMs is due to the use of statistical learning theory [21], which is characterized by
low estimation probability of generalization errors. There are several SVM kernel functions
that can be used in our proposed technique. These include Polynomial kernel (PLY), Linear
(LN), Sigmoidal, and Gaussian Radial Basis Function (RB) as summarized in Table 1 [22].
Table 1. SVM Kernel functions.
Function Equation
Polynomial kernel k(xi, xj) = (γxTi xj + Υ )
d, γ > 0
Linear k(xi, xj) =xTi xj
Sigmoidal Function k((xi, xj) = tanh(γxTi xj + Υ )
Gaussian RB Function k((xi, xj) = exp(−γ ‖ xi − xj ‖2),γ > 0
where xi and xj are the training vectors, d is natural number,Υ is a shifting parameter that control
the threshold, andγ is a scaling parameter. Variables d,Υ, γ are the kernel parameters. Further
discussion on each kernel function can be found in [22].
It is reported [23] that SVM is widely used in IDS because it offers high-speed classifica-
tion, and delivers scalability. Moreover, it is comparatively insensitive to the quantity of information
points with low generalization error. As aforementioned, the proposed method can be used also
for metamorphic malware detection in both host and network-based detection system (directly
from traffic flows). Since NIDS also used signature maching to detect attack and malware, the
present study adopt sub-signature features similar to Varghese et al. [17]. The proposed method
uses only the n-gram features that appear in known malware sub-signature to reduce the feature
search space.
4. Experimental Setup
Experiments were performed on Intel ® core™ i7-4710 HQ at 2.50 GHZ (8GB RAM) on
Linux Ubuntu 14.04 platform. All executable files (metamorphic malware and normal) were first
converted to overlapping 4-grams features. Only the 4-gram metamorphic features that appeared
in Snort features (sub-signatures) were selected. Snort signatures were extracted from Snort
rules version 2.9.5.5. The most important features are chosen using the IG feature selection
method, using Wakaito Environment for Knowledge Acquisition (WEKA) [24]. The important fea-
tures with high rank are used to train and built the classifier model. Next, the model has used
to classify the testing dataset. The SVM classifier was built using Library for Support Vector
Machines (LIBSVM) (https://www.csie.ntu.edu.tw/~cjlin/libsvm/), to simulate online metamorphic
detection after extracting informative 4-gram features directly from executable binary files. Grid
Search is used in training to select optimum effective SVM parameters [25].
The training data set contained labeled metamorphic and non-malware files. Hexdump
utility tool is used to convert the content of binary executable to hexadecimal code, where n-grams
are extracted by combining each 4-byte sequence as one feature [11]. Following [11,18], the size
of n-gram is selected to be 4-grams. Features are represented in terms of normalized frequency
instead of representing each of them as Boolean attribute.
TELKOMNIKA Vol. 14, No. 3, September 2016 : 1157 ∼ 1165
TELKOMNIKA ISSN: 1693-6930  1161
4.1. Dataset Used
The training datasets consisted of normal and metamorphic files. The normal (benign)
executable files of total 1,971 were collected from Window 7, Window XP, and Cygwin [26]. A
total of 1020 metamorphic files were collected: 109 metamorphic files are collected in assembly
format from [27], where Turbo Assembler is used to convert metamorphic files from assembly
to executable format. . 50 files were generated by the Next Generation Virus Construction Kit
(NGVCK), 50 files were used from Second Generation (G2) viruses, and the other 9 files were
employed as Mass Produced Code Generation Kit (MPCGEN) viruses. Furthermore, the NGVCK
kit was also used to generate another 1000 metamorphic files under identical configuration setting.
This construction kit is available in VX Heavens [28]. It can generate strong metamorphic variants
with various obfuscation techniques [1,9]. 911 files were compiled using Turbo Assembler (TASM)
version 5 under Oracle VM VirtualBox version 4.2.16. .
4.2. Dataset Preprocessing
n-grams features were extracted from the training dataset executable files, which include
thousands of features, and most do not contribute to classification. Therefore, Snort malware rules
are used to extract Snort 4-grams sub-signatures (called Snort features). The primary aim being
the detection of metamorphic malware from its payload only the signatures content of malware
are extracted to generate 4-grams.
5. Results and Discussion
In total, 1542 Snort 4-gram features appeared in metamorphic files. For a balanced
training data set, 50% of the metamorphic files are selected in training and building the model
(510 metamorphic and 510 normal files). The rest of the files are used as testing dataset (510
metamorphic and 1461 normal files).
5.1. Accuracy
Figure 3 shows the accuracy of the testing data set after building the classifier from the
training data set. It uses different number of features selected by IG and different kernel functions:
Gaussian Radial Basis Function (RB), Linear (LN), and Polynomial Kernel (PLY). The number
of features affected the accuracy, area under the curve (AUC), false negative rate (FNR), false
positive rate (FPR), true negative rate (TNR), and true positive rate (TPR) as shown in Figure 3.
It is clear that for the number of features greater than 500, the accuracy of the testing data set
appeared stable in terms of AUC, FPR, FNR, TPR, and TNR. The best SVM kernel function is
also analyzed. Radial Base produced the best accuracy, FPR, FNR, TPR, and TNR compared to
other tested kernals.
For further comparison with the work of Alam et al. [1], 359 new normal files with their
sizes range from 1 to 10 MB were added. Thus, the dataset contained 2330 normal files and 1020
metamorphic files with the total size of 3.9 GB, which are classified using 5-fold cross validation in
4.68 sec. Experiments were repeated with different training and testing dataset ratio, as shown in
Figure 4, where the values of accuracy, FPR, FNR, TPR, and TNR are illustrated. The accuracy
of the classifier is shown to be high when the percentage of metamorphic files in the training
dataset ranges between 10% and 50%. Furthermore, the accuracy is found to decrease when
the amount of metamorphic files in the training dataset became greater than 50%. This reduction
in accuracy may be attributed to the imbalance problem due to the less number of normal files
than metamorphic one.
In the rest of the experiments, the classifier was trained with 10% metamorphic files (102
files) and 90% normal files (918). These ratios of malware and normal files were chosen to be
similar to the real-life situation with the number of malware is less than 10% [13]. The testing data
set contained the remaining 90% of the metamorphic files (918 files) and 1412 normal files. The
accuracy is found to be 99.7% when RB kernal function has been used.
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Figure 3. Testing dataset results for different number of features and different Kernel functions.
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Figure 4. Accuracy, FPR, TPR, FNR, TNR of the testing dataset.
5.2. Comparison with Related Works
The performance of the proposed metamorphic malware detection method was compared
with the results of Alam et al. [1] using the same kit-generated the metamorphic files [28]. In
the experiment, NGVCK was used to generate highly metamorphic viruses [29]. Identical size
data set (1020 metamorphic files and 2,330 normal files that were used [1] through 5-fold cross
validation. The results were compared with several results in literature as summarized in Table
2. The proposed technique revealed very high detection rate. The results presented in [4,15,30]
showed better accuracy compared to the present one and [1] possibly because of limited dataset
size.
Table 2 compares the performance of our proposed method with some existing works.
The high DR (TPR) percentage achieved by the proposed method is a clear indication of major
metamorphic malware detection such as NGVCK, which is not possible to detect using the other
methods [9]. Furthermore, the use of small data set size in other methods [4, 15, 30] makes the
detection rates somewhat higher. The occurrence of extremely low FPR of our method may be as-
cribed to the feature selection by Snort sub-signatures which can select informative metamorphic
features and effective implementation of radial-based SVM.
5.3. Comparison with Anti-Viruses Scanners
The effectiveness of the proposed technique was evaluated by comparing the results
against commercial anti-viruses to detect metamorphic files. Other anti-virus tools were tested
with identical dataset of metamorphic files. The detection rates are shown in Table 3. The best
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Table 2. Comparison with related works.
System Analysis DR FPR Malware/Normal Platform
Proposed method Static 99.6% 0.3% 1020/2330 Win&Linux64
Opcode-Histogram [4] Static 100% 0% 60/40 Win&Linux32
Opcode- histogram [14] Static 99.5% 1.3% 1090/921 Win32
SWOD-CFWeight [1] Static 94.69% 10.59% 1020/2330 Win&Linux64
Opcode-Graph [15] Static 100% 1% 200/41 Win&Linux32
Opcode-SD [5] Static ~ 98% ~ 0.5% 800/40 Linux32
Chi-Squared [29] Static ~ 98% ~ 2% 200/40 Win&Linux32
Opcode-HMM [30] Static 100% 0% 200/40 Win&Linux32
Opcode-PHMM [9] Static ~100% - 240/70 Win32
detection rate is obtained with Kaspersky that is able to detect MPCGEN correctly and several
G2 files. However, it could not detect any NGVCK viruses that were generated by the kit [28].
Thus, it is affirmed that our method can detect complex metamorphic malware types that remain
unrecognized by commercial anti-viruses. This high level of detection capability is ascribed to the
combined effects of term frequency features extraction and their masking with known malware
sub-signature for accurate metamorphic classification.
Table 3. Comparison with commercial anti-viruses.
Anti-virus Detection Rate
Proposed method 99.69%
Kaspersky 30.68%
AVG 17.35%
Comodo 14.80%
Avast 6.96%
Avira 6.17%
6. Conclusion
We proposed an effective technique to detect metamorphic malware with high accuracy
and low false positive rate by combining n-gram Snort signatures and SVM. Metamorphic malware
executable detection is achieved using only 500 features of n-gram Snort-masked sub-signatures.
The proposed method exhibits its superiority with higher accuracy and lower false positive over
various AVs. It improves the metamorphic detection accuracy remarkably, but at the same time
the proposed method can not detect several metamorphic files if they mutated several times us-
ing substituting instructions with equivalent instructions. Since the detection of some malware
types in network is very arduous [31], the present method can be extended in NIDS to detecting
metamorphic malware in network-based with real traffic traces especially when implemented as
hardware system such as using field-programmable gate array (FPGA) .
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